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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between access to finance and labor 
market performance in the EU28 for the period 2003-2017. For this 
purpose, we first construct a composite indicator to measure access to 
finance by equal-weighting information about days needed to be paid, 
rejected loans, the willingness of banks to provide a loan, interest rate for 
small loans, venture capital, private equity, business angels, and public 
funding. Secondly, using a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), we estimate 
the relationship between the employment and unemployment growth rates 
on our access to finance indicator while controlling for main macro-
economic variables. Our results suggest that improved access to finance is 
likely to stimulate labor market performance - increased access to finance 
generates increased employment growth rates, and decreased 
unemployment growth rates respectively. Findings contribute to empirical 
literature and have important policy implications. Improving business 
environment conditions for SMEs through access to finance could 
improve labor market outcomes. 
 
Keywords: access to finance; labor market; small and medium-sized enterprises 
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1 Introduction  
Unemployment rate, its evolution, and main drivers is an important concern for academicians 
and practitioners alike (see for example Boeri & Burda, 1996; Blanchard & Diamond, 1989; 
Bonthuis, Jarvis, & Vanhala, 2013). This is mainly because of its further social and economic 
implications. On the one hand, the unemployment rate reduces the quality of life of those under 
unemployment by minimizing their spendable income and inducing feelings of depression, low 
self-esteem and anxiety (see for example Darity & Goldsmith, 1996). On the other, an increase 
in the unemployment rate has a negative impact on the national budget both from the social 
benefits governmental expenditures perspective and from the fiscal incomes one. 
 
Research has focused mainly on the impact of labor market institutions and policies on the 
unemployment rate. The main area of debate has been rigid versus flexible labor markets with 
a widespread idea that rigid labor markets are detrimental to employment rates (see for example 
Blasco & Pertold-Gebicka, 2013; Boeri, Conde-Ruiz, & Galasso, 2002; Bova, Jalles, & 
Kolerus, 2016; Fertig, M.Schmidt, & Schneider, 2006; Kraft, 2010). However, in the last two 
decades, several researchers have questioned the interplay between the business environment 
conditions, including access to fiance, and the labor market outputs. They argued that reforms 
in labor market institutions and policies were not enough to achieve better employment and 
lower unemployment desideratum. In this context, they bring about the idea of the positive 
impact of improved business environment conditions (Acemoglu, 2001; Belke, Fehn, & Foster, 
2004; Blanchard, Jaumotte, & Loungani, 2014) and access to finance (Feldman 2014) on the 
employment rate. With the recent financial recession, the deterioration in financing 
opportunities was succeeded by increases in unemployment rates and contractions in job 
creation and employment rates, respectively. As such, it has increased the interest in the study 
of the impact of the firm’s access to finance on (un)employment and job creation (Boeri, 
Garibaldi, & Moen, 2018). So far, most of the empirical studies focused on the impact of access 
to finance on job creation at the firm level. The macro-level contributions in the field are still 
scarce - Borsi (2018); Belke et al. (2003; 2004),  Cingano, Leonardi, Messina, & Pica (2014); 
Feldmann (2010; 2013; 2014)  and Papapetrou & Tsalaporta (2017) are notable exemptions.  
 
Our paper contributes to the literature by exploring macro-evidences. We test the hypothesis 
that better access to finance opportunities for the SMEs have a positive impact on the labor 
market performance. In order to fulfill our goal, we employ data on the EU28 member states 
for the 2003-2017 period. Being access to finance a multidimensional concept, we proxy access 
to finance by constructing a composite indicator of Access to finance. We equal-weight eight 
indicators related to different types of financing (such as bank lending, venture capital or private 
equity) some of them specifically related to SMEs. We then study the relationship between our 
access to finance indicator and employment and unemployment growth rates while controlling 
for main macro-economic and labor market indicators and using a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation with country and time fixed effects. 
 
As far as we know, this is the first macro-level study using a composite measure of access to 
finance and focusing on the European Union’s member states. Previous macro-level studies 
used specific indicators that may not capture the several financial channels and opportunities, 
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to analyze either the OECD countries (Belke et al., 2003; 2004; Papapetrou & Tsalaporta, 2017) 
or developing economies (Feldmann, 2015). 
 
From a policy action point of view, the European Commission’s ’Small Business Act’ (SBA) 
motivates the goal of this paper. It was enacted in 2008 as part of the Lisbon Strategy to place 
the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at the heart of Europe’s strategies to 
boost jobs, economic growth, and well-being and included access to finance as one of its ten 
pillars1 (European Commission, 2008). 
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the theoretical and 
empirical literature in the field and discuss the institutional context. In section 3, we introduce the 
data and methodology. In Section 4, we present and discuss the estimated results. Finally, we draw 
conclusions and policy implications in Section 5. 
 
                                           
1 The ‘Small Business Act’ evaluates the performance and context of the SMEs across the EU28 member states based 
on a framework comprised of 77 indicators pertaining to 10 pillars - (1) Entrepreneurship, (2) Second chance, (3) Think 
small first, (4) Responsive administration, (5) State aid public procurement, (6) Access to finance, (7) Single market, (8) 
Skills and innovation, (9) Environment, and (10) Internationalization. 
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2 Literature review and institutional background 
Linkages between financing opportunities of enterprises and the evolution of unemployment 
and employment rates have not received too much of attention in labor market literature. There 
are references tackling the issue from a theoretical point of view, some studies following an 
empirical approach at firm level and few attempts trying to explore how the theoretical models 
and micro evidences translate into macro-economic measures such as unemployment and 
employment levels and growth rates. 
 
Regarding theoretical studies, Acemoglu (2001) shows that in markets with credit frictions, a 
technological shock limits the employment growth in highly credit dependent industries. His 
results suggest that an economy with credit market frictions may undergo high unemployment 
periods since potential entrepreneurs need time to acquire wealth for future job creation. 
Wasmer & Weil (2004) theorize the existence of a financial accelerator in an economy with 
credit and labor market imperfections. They suggest that further cross-sectional empirical 
research would help understand why changes in labor market reforms do not yield the expected 
changes in unemployment rates and whether financial conditions could explain better the 
evolution of unemployment.  Petrosky-Nadeau & Wasmer (2013) extend the Wasmer & Weil 
(2004) allowing frictions to affect all firms in the economy. They find out a strong interaction 
between frictions in the financial and labor markets. Garín (2015) shows that higher credit 
constraints increase the cost of labor, which translates into a decrease in the net benefit of hiring 
an extra worker. 
 
Empirical studies that focus on the impact of financing opportunities at firm level have found 
that there are at least three financial channels able to display a positive impact on employment 
at firm level: bank lending, venture capital, and public funding (Kersten, Harms, Liket, & Maas, 
2017).  
 
Firstly, banks and credit institutions play the dominant role in access to external finance of 
SMEs. According to the Survey of Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), in 2018, bank 
loans represent a relevant source of external financing for 47% of the SMEs in the EU. Bank 
lending deterioration has a negative impact on employment rates inside firms. Berton, Mocetti, 
Presbitero, & Richiardi (2018) find evidences for the Veneto region of Italy, Bentolila, Jansen, 
& Jiménez (2017) find evidences for Spainish firms during the 2000-2010 period and Gerlach-
Kristen, O’Connell, & O’Toole (2015) find evidences for Irish firms.  
 
Secondly, venture capital stimulates job creation by lowering firms’ financial constraints. 
Davila, Foster, & Gupta (2003) show it for 500 USA start-up companies (193 – venture-backed 
and 301 – non-venture-backed) during 1994-1999.  
 
And thirdly, public financing programs are intended to overcome market failures, by providing 
the SMEs with the means to invest and improve their performance, which in turn stimulates job 
creation (Benavente, Crespi, & Maffioli, 2007; Kersten et al., 2017). On average, public 
financing programs have a positive effect on the employment rates inside SMEs. Depending on 
the type of public funding analyzed, the impact on employment can be observed during periods 
that range from 1 to 10 years (Arraiz, Melendez, & Stucchi, 2014; Negri, Maffioli, Rodriguez, 
 9 
& Vázquez, 2011; Kersten et al., 2017).  Brown & Earle (2017) observe an increased job 
creation in the first three years after the receipt of a loan. Arraiz, Melendez, & Stucchi (2014) 
find out that firms in Colombia that gain access to credit backed by the National guarantee Fund 
during 1997-2007 were able to grow in terms of both output and employment. Negri et al. 
(2011) shows that provision of credit through second-tier development banks in Brazil 
effectively improve firm’s competitiveness in terms of employment growth.  
 
Existing macro-level studies support that micro-level findings hold at macro-economic level: 
better financing opportunities generate improved labor market performance. Borsi (2018) 
analyze OECD countries over the 1980-2013 period and finds that after the start of a credit 
contraction there are typically increases in the total unemployment rate of about 1%. Increases 
are even more substantial in the case of youth in which case it amounts to about 2.5%. For the 
same country sample and for the 1970-2013 period, Papapetrou & Tsalaporta (2017) analyze 
the effect of credit constraints accounting for labor market institutions and fiscal imbalances on 
the unemployment rate. Feldmann (2014 and 2015) analyses the impact of bank concentration 
on labor market performance in industrial countries and in 42 developing countries over the 
1987-2007 period. In both cases, his findings suggest a negative impact of bank credit 
availability on the unemployment rate. 
 
Belke et al. (2003, 2004) estimate the direct impact of variables measuring venture capital on 
both employment and unemployment rates in 20 OECD countries for the 1987-1999 period. 
They find a positive significant dynamic effect of the venture capital investment on the 
employment rate. Using the same country sample over the 1992-2003 period, Feldmann (2010) 
concludes that greater and more readily available venture capital investments increase 
employment rates across the economy. Feldmann (2014) reconfirms those findings in a broader 
sample of 78 countries over the 1992-2007 period. 
 
Micro-evidences show that access to finance operates by more than one financial channel which 
gives ground to the calculation of an access to finance composite indicator able to capture the 
multidimensionality of it. However, there is no available evidence of the macroeconomic effect 
of a measure including several financial channels and the several alternatives that companies 
may have at their disposal.  
 
The ‘Small Business Act’ directly links SMEs’ development with the generation of employment 
opportunities and local and regional well-being and makes access to finance to SMEs one of its 
ten pillars. The European Commission has continuously declared in its policy papers its 
commitment to foster an inclusive environment with more and better jobs and higher social 
cohesion (see for example Europe 2020, 2010; Jobs, Growth and Investment, 2014; European 
Pillar of Social Rights, 2017). The European Commission provides annually the Country Fact 
Sheets and a Scientific Report evaluating the state of the EU28 countries in several SBA 
dimensions, including access to finance. Yet, there is no study, as to our knowledge, testing the 
relationship between access to finance as defined by the SBA framework and the labor market 
performance inside the EU member.  
 
 10 
Against the above background, this paper aims to explore additional evidences of the links 
between access to finance and labor market performance, testing the relationship of a composite 
measure of access to finance that includes several financial channels and focusing on European 
Union member states where policy efforts have been focusing on facilitating entrepreneurship 
to generate employment and reduce unemployment.  
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3 Data and methods 
3.1 Estimation Strategy 
 
In estimating the impact of access to finance on our labor market outcomes we firstly ran a 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS)2 model with country and time fixed effects3: 
 
𝑌௜,௧ ൌ 𝛽ଵ𝐴𝐹௜,௧ ൅  𝛽ଶ𝑍௜,௧ ൅  𝛼௜ ൅  𝜆௧ ൅ 𝜖௜,௧, (1) 
 
where 𝑌௜,௧ is the labor market outcome of country i at the year t, 𝐴𝐹௜,௧ is an access to finance 
indicator and 𝑍௜,௧ is a vector of control variables. 𝛼௜ and 𝜆௧ are country and time fixed effects, 
respectively. Finally, 𝜖௜,௧ is the error term.  
 
Regarding endogeneity problems, literature has documented that reverse causality between 
labor market outcomes and the access to finance indicators is likely to occur (see, for example, 
Feldmann, 2013, 2014, 2015; Belke et al., 2003, 2004). Taking that into account, we ran a 
Hausman test on the POLS regressions. Based on the results of Hausmann test, we conclude 
that our model suffers from endogeneity. To extract the exogenous effect of access to finance 
indicator, we re-estimated the model through Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). We 
instrumented our access to finance measure with lagged differences covering the last three years 
following same method as Feldmann (2014) and Feldmann (2015)4: 
 
First stage: 
 
𝐴𝐹௜,௧ ൌ  ∑ 𝛽ଷ൫𝐴𝐹௜,௧ି௦ െ 𝐴𝐹௜,௧ି௦ିଵ൯ ൅  𝛽ସ𝑍௜,௧ ൅  𝛾௜ ൅  𝜅௧ ൅ 𝜂௜,௧ଶ௦ୀଵ  (2) 
 
Second stage: 
𝑌௜,௧ ൌ 𝛽ଵ𝐴𝐹௜,௧ ൅  𝛽ଶ𝑍௜,௧ ൅  𝛼௜ ൅  𝜆௧ ൅  𝜖௜,௧ (3) 
 
where 𝑌௜,௧ is the labour market outcome of country i at the year t, 𝐴𝐹௜,௧ is our access to finance 
indicator and 𝑍௜,௧ is our vector of control variables. We controlled for the impact of country 
specificity and cross-country common shocks by including country (𝛾௜ and 𝛼௜) and time (𝜅௧and 𝜆௧) fixed effects, respectively. Finally, 𝜂௜,௧and 𝜖௜,௧ are the error terms. 
 
                                           
2 This model is unlikely to be adequate, but it provides a baseline for comparisons with more complex estimators. 
3 We considered fixed effects due to the homogeneity of our sample.  We included country eﬀects to control for unobserved country-specific 
effects. Further on, we included time fixed eﬀects to control for potential common shocks aﬀecting the countries such as financial or 
technological shocks as theoretical literature emphasized the impact of access to finance in the presence of such shocks. 
4 In additional estimations, we also controlled for simultaneous determination in case of main economic indicators (GDP growth and inflation 
rate). Estimation results did not change, thus in the spirit of Feldmann (2014) we instrumented only the ’Access to finance’ indicator. 
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Based on the results of Wu-Hausman and Sargan tests, we conclude that our instruments are 
valid, providing support for the 2SLS estimation.  Therefore, we have estimated Models through 
2SLS with country and time fixed effects to overcome the endogeneity between access to 
finance and labor market outcomes. Our estimates are consistent and the chosen instruments 
are valid as they are strong enough to capture the endogeneity. 
3.2 Data 
We employ data on the EU28 member states for the 2003-2017 period. As endogenous 
variables, we use both the employment rate and the unemployment rate5 (Feldmann, 2010, 
2013, 2014; Papapetrou and Tsalaporta, 2017). Following the work of Belke et al. (2004)6, we 
subsequently modeled the growth rates of these variables. For definitions, sources and 
descriptive statistics see Table 1.  
 
Table 1. List of of endogenous variables – description and summary statistics  
Variable Description Summary statistics 
Min.  Median Mean Max.  
Employment 
rate 
Percentage of active population aged 15-
64 [Source: Eurostat] 44.3 64.7 65.05 86.6 
Unemployment 
rate 
Percentage of active population aged 15-
64 [Source: Eurostat] 2.3 7.7 8.679 27.5 
Employment 
growth rate 
Annual growth rate of employment rate 
[Source: Own computations based on 
Eurostat data on employment rate] -11.58 0.78 0.59 6.70 
Unemployment 
growth rate 
Annual growth rate of unemployment 
rate [Source: Own computations based 
on Eurostat data on unemployment rate] -30.93 -2.30 0.65 145.46 
 
3.2.1 Access to finance 
To measure the SMEs’ degree of access to finance, we re-construct the ’Access to Finance’ 
composite indicator of the European Commission (Ghisetti & Pedraza, 2017) taking into 
account Feldman (2014) (see Table 2 for detailed variable description, sources and main 
descriptive statistics)7. As such, we consider the following variables: total duration in days to 
                                           
5 In countries in which there is lack of incentives to register as unemployed, the real unemployment rate might be higher than the reported one 
(Blanchard et al., 2015). 
6 We tested for the presence of unit roots in the series of (un)employment rates, GDP, GDP per capita, and inflation rate. Since neither of the 
five series we tested has missing values, the most appropriate unit root test is the Levin, Lin, and Chu. Except for the employment rates, all the 
series reject the null of the presence of a unit root. We also tested the independent variables, concluding in stationary series for all applied tests. 
Given all the tests are asymptotic, and our data set contains a low number of time observations (15 years), we treat all the results with 
cautiousness. To avoid possible misspecifications, we further used GDP growth as well as (un)employment growth rates which are known in 
the literature to be stationary processes (see also Belke et al., 2004). 
 
7 The initial indicator computed in Ghisetti & Pedraza (2017) used a larger list of ten indicators. They included ’Strength of legal rights’ and 
’Bad debt loss.’ The two indicators suffered a change in computation methodology in 2015. In order to assure consistency of our indicator, we 
excluded them for the present analysis. However, when computing the indicator following Ghisetti & Pedraza (2017), it showcases a correlation 
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be paid, rejected loan applications, the willingness of banks to provide a loan, , venture capital, 
private equity, business angels and public funding (Ghisetti and Pedraza 2017) and annual 
average interest rate for small loans (Feldman, 2014).  
Table 2. List of ’Access to Finance’ components (not standardized) - description and summary statistics8  
Variable Description Summary statistics 
Min.  Median Mean Max.  
Venture capital investments 
(+) 
Percent of GDP 
[Source: Eurostat] 0 0.04 0.04176 0.32 
Equity funding available for 
new and growing firms (+) 
Likert scale 1-5: 1=worst; 5=best 
[Source: National Expert Survey 
(NES) of the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM)] 1.41 2.62 2.636 4.16 
Professional Business Angels 
funding available for new and 
growing firms (+) 
Likert scale 1-5: 1=worst; 5=best 
[Source: National Expert Survey 
(NES) of the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM)] 1 2.49 2.498 3.75 
Access to public financial 
support including guarantees  
(-) 
Share of companies that indicated a 
deterioration 
[Source: Survey on the Access to 
Finance of Enterprises (SAFE)] 2.04 17.49 19.15 69.27 
Rejected loan applications and 
loan offers whose conditions 
were deemed unacceptable (-) 
Percentage of loan applications by 
SMEs 
[Source: Survey on the Access to 
Finance of Enterprises (SAFE)] 0 12.42 13.18 42.98 
Willingness of banks to 
provide a loan (-) 
Percentage share of respondents who 
indicated a deterioration 
[Source: Survey on the Access to 
Finance of Enterprises (SAFE)] 1.94 21.01 22.14 68.07 
Total duration in days to get 
paid 
(-) 
Number of days it takes for a 
company to get its invoices paid by 
the customer (average of B-2-C, B-2-
B, and Public authorities) 
[Source: European Payment Index, 
White paper, Intrum Justitia] 13 43 48.57 120.67 
Annual average of interest rate 
for small loans (-) 
[Source: European Central Bank 
except for the UK in which case the 
source is Bank of England] 0 4.18 4.246 18.21 
                                           
of 99.42% with our indicator, and the results of the analysis do not change. Also, in plus from Ghisetti & Pedraza (2017) we add to this 
framework the ‘annual average of interest rate for small loans’.  
 
8 All indicators are SMEs related. Further details on this respect can be found at  
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browseExplanation.do?node=9689717 for SAFE indicators and  
https://www.gemconsortium.org/data/sets for GEM indicators. 
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In constructing the composite indicator, we followed Nardo et al. (2014) and Ghisetti & Pedraza 
(2017). We firstly checked for the presence of reporting errors and outliers in the data. We 
flagged indicators having skewness (absolute) greater than 2 and kurtosis greater than 3.5, 
which are thresholds widely adopted in the context of composite indicators to detect potential 
outliers. As they are only heuristic rules of thumb, each flagged case needs to be analyzed 
individually to determine whether any outlier treatment is needed. We found it necessary for 
the case of ’public funding,’ in which case we treated outliers by winsorization9. 
 
Secondly, we treated missing values through a multiple steps imputation algorithm that 
combines a data-driven bootstrap time-series cross-sectional expectation-maximization 
approach in the spirit of Honaker & King (2010). We re-scaled Likert scale data to a 0-5 scale 
after the imputation. 
 
Thirdly, we normalized the variables to achieve a common scale. To this aim, we considered a 
min-max normalization in which all the indicators take a scale from 0 to 1. Re-scaling widens 
the range of an indicator. In the context of composite indicators, this provides an advantage for 
those indicators with a small range of values since it allows differentiation between countries 
with similar levels of SMEs’ performance. However, min-max normalization is not appropriate 
in the presence of extreme values or outliers, which can distort the normalized indicator. To 
control for this, in step 1 above, we identified and treated extreme values. 
 
At this stage, we also took into consideration the direction of the variable’s effects. For 
example, higher values of ’venture capital investments’ showcase higher degrees of access to 
finance since the variable is measured in percent of GDP. In this case, we re-scaled the variable 
by using the formula: 
 
𝑥௜ െ 𝑚𝑎𝑥ሺ𝑥ሻ 𝑚𝑎𝑥ሺ𝑥ሻ െ 𝑚𝑖𝑛ሺ𝑥ሻ൘ ሺ1ሻ. 
 
On the other hand, higher values of ’willingness of banks to provide a loan’ showcase lower 
degrees of access to finance since the variable is measured in percent of respondents that 
indicated a deterioration in the variable. In this case we re-scaled the variable by using the 
formula: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥ሺ𝑥ሻ െ 𝑥௜ 𝑚𝑎𝑥ሺ𝑥ሻ െ 𝑚𝑖𝑛ሺ𝑥ሻ൘  ሺ2ሻ. 
                                           
9 Outliers can polarize the findings and bias the results. As such, we detect outliers based on skewness or kurtosis. Further on, we treat them 
by assigning them the next closest value, up to the level where its skewness and kurtosis become acceptable. 
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In Table 2 we marked with the ’+’ sign all of the variables in which case we rescaled based on 
(1) and with ’-’ all of those for which we rescaled based on (2). 
 
Following these pre-processing stages, we aggregated the variables in a composite indicator 
through the arithmetic mean which imply we are assuming perfect substitutability among 
indicators, i.e., poor performance in one indicator can be fully compensated by good 
performance in another. This suits our case because of two reasons. On the one hand, our 
research hypothesis is that access to finance of SMEs has a positive impact on the employment 
rate, regardless of its source. On the other, we are evaluating the impact of one of the SBA’s 
dimensions and follow its methodology (see Ghisetti & Pedraza, 2017) including interest rates 
as an additional indicator most commonly used by literature (Feldman 2015).  
 
Lastly, we re-scaled the indicator on a 0-100 scale. 
 
Based on the correlations in 2017 between each variable and ‘access to finance’ composite 
indicator, the contribution of the variables to the indicator range from 26% to 84%. The lowest 
contributions are those of ‘venture capital availability’ (26%) and ‘rejected loans’ (43%). The 
highest contributions are those of ‘equity funding’ (84%) and ‘public finance’ (68%).  
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of employment, and unemployment growth rates (right axis) and 
access to finance (left axis), the graphs show a perfectly reverse story. On the one hand, 
employment growth rate smoothly increased from 2003 to 2007  before decreasing  and entering  
negative numbers reaching its  minimum in 2009 (-2,76%). From 2009 to 2017 it recovered 
reaching rates higher than the pre-2009 ones (2.16% in 2017). On the other hand, 
unemployment growth rate shows a smooth decrease until 2007 (-11.86%), and afterwards and 
increasing trend until 2009 followed by a decreasing tendency, reaching rates lower than the 
pre-2009 ones (-12.89% in 2017). The two variables move in opposite directions. The scales of 
the two evolutions are very different: for employment growth rate (its values ranging from -
2.79% to 2.16%) and for unemployment growth rate (its values ranging from -12.89% to 
40.63%), respectively. 
 
Increases in access to finance are accompanied by increases in employment growth rates and 
decreases in unemployment growth rates. Correlation between access to finance and the 
employment growth RATE is 69%. Correlation between access to finance and unemployment 
growth rate is of -58%. In the following section we further explore this relationship by 
controlling for several macro-economic and labor market indicators. 
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Figure 1. The evolution of access to finance against the evolution of employment growth rate (left pane) and of 
unemployment growth rate (right pane) – EU28 average  
 
 
3.2.2 Control variables 
 
We control for main macro-economic and labor market indicators following existing literature 
(Table 3). We test for the stability of results by estimating several specifications. In our baseline 
model (Model 1), we accounted for GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rate, trade openness, 
labor market regulation index, and top marginal tax rate index. Following Feldmann (2014), we 
control for trade openness and top marginal tax rate in order to ensure that access to finance 
estimated elasticity  does not absorb business environment conditions as a whole Following 
literature on the impact of labor market policies and institutions on the evolution of 
unemployment rates (Bentolila et al. 2012, Bova et al 2016) we account for the labor market 
institutional context using the labor market regulation index developed by the Fraser Institute 
(Feldmann 2014). Generally, the research agrees on the detrimental impact of rigid 
environments on the unemployment rate evolution. .  
 
In a first robustness check (Model 2), we substitute the labor market regulation index with the 
more conventional measures: minimum wage, unemployment benefits, employment protection 
legislation (EPL), spending with active labor market policies (ALMP), trade union density and 
collective bargaining coverage rate. In line with previous literature, we expect more stringent 
EPL and higher unemployment benefits to have a negative impact on the employment growth 
rate (Bentolila et al., 2012; Bova et al., 2016). On the other hand, literature documents a 
generally positive impact of ALMPs on employment growth rates (Bova et al. 2016; Kraft, 
1998). 
 
 
In a second robustness check (Model 3), we replace the top marginal tax rate index with a more 
comprehensive business regulation index. Blanchard et al. (2014) suggest that lowering barriers 
to the entry of new firms increases competition and in turn, fosters employment in the respective 
sectors. 
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In a third robustness check (Model 4), we consider inflation rate as the labor economics 
literature suggests it as a good predictor of employment and unemployment rate (see for 
example Tobin, 1995)10. In a fourth robustness check (Model 5), we add the credit market 
regulation index. In the last check (Model 6), we add the freedom of trade index.  
 
                                           
10 The inflation - unemployment rate relationship is widely known as an endogenous one. In the present estimations, we do not instrument for 
the inflation rate since, in our sample, the inflation rate is targeted by the Central Banks. 
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4 Results 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the regressions explained in the previous section. The 
coefficient of the access to finance index is statistically significant in all the models, remaining 
significant at alternative specifications with different control variables. Also, its size is very 
similar to the baseline specifications presented in the first column of both tables. 
Table 3. Regressions to explain the employment growth rate 
Independent 
variables 
Baseline 
specification 
(Model 1) 
Alternative 
labor 
market 
regulation 
indicators 
(Model 2) 
Top 
marginal 
tax rate 
substituted 
by business 
regulation 
index 
(Model 3) 
Inflation 
rate added 
(Model 4) 
Credit 
market 
regulation 
added 
(Model 5) 
Freedom 
of trade 
added 
(Model 6) 
Access to 
finance index 
0.2105*** 
(0.0478) 
0.2676*** 
(0.0527) 
0.2103*** 
(0.0478) 
0.2248*** 
(0.0514) 
0.2124*** 
(0.0496) 
0.2072*** 
(0.0480) 
GDP growth 
rate 
0.1206*** 
(0.0226) 
0.1307*** 
(0.0238) 
0.1203*** 
(0.0227) 
0.1103*** 
(0.0244) 
0.1206*** 
(0.0227) 
0.1225*** 
(0.0227) 
Trade openness 0.0212** 
(0.0091) 
0.0134 
(0.0102) 
0.0206** 
(0.0092) 
0.0224** 
(0.0092) 
0.0211** 
(0.0092) 
0.0217** 
(0.0091) 
Labor market 
regulation index 
-0.0013 
(0.0238) 
 -0.0008 
(0.0254) 
-0.0023 
(0.0241) 
-0.0002 
(0.0241) 
-0.0018 
(0.0238) 
Top marginal 
tax rate index 
-0.0124 
(0.0146) 
-0.0135 
(0.0175) 
 -0.0113 
(0.4425) 
-0.0118 
(0.0146) 
-0.0134 
(0.0145) 
Employment 
protection 
legislation a 
 -0.4784 
(0.6694) 
    
Minimum wage 
b 
 -0.0278 
(0.0182) 
    
Unemployment 
benefits 
 -0.8852 
(0.6252) 
    
Spending with 
active labor 
market polices c 
 3.5116*** 
(1.2276) 
    
Collective 
bargaining 
 -0.0405** 
(0.0199) 
    
Business 
regulation index 
  0.0051 
(0.0397) 
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Inflation rate    0.1271 
(0.0858) 
  
Credit market 
regulation index 
    -0.009 
(0.0210) 
 
Freedom of 
trade index 
     0.0805 
(0.0783) 
Number of 
observations 
292 233 292 291 291 291 
Number of 
countries 
28 26 28 28 28 28 
Weak 
instruments 
test 
34.746*** 
(0.0000) 
33.083*** 
(0.0000) 
33.850*** 
(0.0000) 
30.947*** 
(0.0000) 
 
33.295*** 
(0.0000) 
 
34.043*** 
(0.0000) 
 
Wu-Hausman 
test 
7.697*** 
(0.0059) 
12.324*** 
(0.0005) 
7.720*** 
(0.0058) 
8.168*** 
(0.0047) 
7.672*** 
(0.0060) 
7.454*** 
(0.0067) 
 
Sargan test 0.041 
(0.8388) 
0.398 
(0.5282) 
0.060 
(0.8060) 
0.043 
(0.8363) 
0.042 
(0.8375) 
0.076 
(0.7832) 
 
Notes: Results of Two Stage Least Squares with country-specific and year-specific fixed eﬀects. ’Access 
to finance index’ is instrumented through its lagged diﬀerences covering the previous three years. Robust 
standard errors, adjusted for clusters at the country level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level. 
 
a In current specification we use the EPL index as computed by OECD. In alternative specifications we 
also used the EPL index computed by ILO. b In alternative specifications we used a dummy variable for 
the existence of a minimum wage. c In alternative specifications we use the participation in ALMP. 
 
Table 4. Regressions to explain the unemployment growth rate 
Independent 
variables 
Baseline 
specification 
Alternative 
labor 
market 
regulation 
indicators 
Top 
marginal tax 
rate 
substituted 
by business 
regulation 
index 
Inflation 
rate added 
Credit 
market 
regulation 
added 
Freedom of 
trade added 
Access to 
finance index 
-1.3605*** 
(0.4654) 
-1.8763*** 
(0.4297) 
-1.3581** 
(0.48198) 
-1.2482** 
(0.5125) 
-1.4136*** 
(0.4684) 
-1.3190** 
(0.4693) 
GDP growth rate -1.2111*** -1.3398*** -1.2189*** -1.2915*** -1.2121*** -1.2357*** 
 20 
(0.3764) (0.3775) (0.3687) (0.4288) (0.3926) (0.3675) 
Trade openness -0.2539 
(0.1403) 
-0.2951 
(0.1832) 
-0.2463 
(0.1409) 
-0.2442 
(0.1378) 
-0.2516 
(0.1363) 
-0.2601 
(0.1326) 
Labor market 
regulation index 
0.1487 
(0.2330) 
 0.1127 
(0.2606) 
0.1407 
(0.2067) 
0.1198 
(0.2557) 
0.1546 
(0.2079) 
Top marginal tax 
rate index 
0.1749 
(0.1591) 
0.3364 
(0.1915) 
 0.1830 
(0.1488) 
0.1606 
(0.1671) 
0.1876 
(0.1668) 
Employment 
protection 
legislation a 
 6.7006 
(10.6961) 
    
Minimum wage b  -0.0987 
(0.1392) 
    
Unemployment 
benefits 
 1.6820 
(6.5746) 
    
Spending with 
active labor 
market polices c 
 -32.8266** 
(11.2747) 
    
Collective 
bargaining 
 0.1280 
(0.1920) 
    
Business 
regulation index 
  0.0752 
(0.3601) 
   
Inflation rate    0.9954 
(1.1200) 
  
Credit market 
regulation index 
    0.2462 
(0.2307) 
 
Freedom of trade 
index 
     -1.0279 
(0.7050) 
Number of 
observations 
292 233 292 291 291 291 
Number of 
countries 
28 26 28 28 28 28 
Weak 
instruments test 
41.7160*** 
(0.0000) 
29.5270*** 
(0.0000) 
45.0140*** 
(0.0000) 
33.0690*** 
(0.0000) 
30.2000*** 
(0.0000) 
44.4110*** 
(0.0000) 
Wu-Hausman 
test 
5.4870** 
(0.0268) 
6.7740** 
(0.0162) 
5.3570** 
(0.0285) 
3.6560* 
(0.0665) 
5.8790** 
(0.0223) 
5.2850** 
(0.0295) 
 21 
Sargan test 0.0490 
(0.8246) 
0.3380 
(0.5612) 
0.0970 
(0.7556) 
0.0490 
(0.8257) 
0.0510 
(0.8211) 
0.129 
(0.7199) 
Notes: Results of Two Stage Least Squares with country-specific and year-specific fixed effects. ’Access 
to finance index’ is instrumented through its lagged differences covering the previous three years. Robust 
standard errors, adjusted for clusters at the country level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level. 
 
a In current specification we use the EPL index as computed by OECD. In alternative specifications we 
also used the EPL index computed by ILO. b In alternative specifications we used a dummy variable for 
the existence of a minimum wage. c In alternative specifications we use the participation in ALMP. 
 
The estimates suggest that increases in access to finance for SMEs has a positive impact on 
employment growth rate while a negative effect on unemployment growth rate. These results 
are in line with existing theoretical, firm level and previous macro level findings that use 
unidimensional indicators of access to finance. The results suggest that better access to finance 
improves overall labor market performance also after controlling for main macro-economic and 
labor market variables. Results also support using a Composite Indicators of access to finance 
index to capture different financing opportunities.  
 
More specifically, a one standard deviation increase in access to finance is associated with an 
approximate of 2 to 2.5 percentage points increase in the employment growth rate and a 
decrease in the unemployment growth rate between 12.5 to 18 percentage points. These values 
are computed based on the smallest and largest coefficients from Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
It is worth to notice that the impact of the control variables on the labor market performance 
are also in line with what was expected. Higher economic growth is associated with higher 
employment growth and lower unemployment growth, respectively. In line with previous 
research (Feldmann, 2014), these results suggest that better economic environment enables an 
inclusive job market. Similarly, an increase in trade openness is associated with higher 
employment growth rates (Blanchard et al., 2014).  
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5 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of a multidimensional measure of access to finance 
on employment and unemployment growth rates for a panel of 28 countries (EU member states) 
over the 2003-2017 periods. For this purpose, we conduct a two-stage least squares estimation 
with country and year fixed effects in order to account for the possible endogeneity between 
our access to finance indicator and labor market performance variables. In order to capture 
access to finance in each country, we calculate a composite indicator following generally 
accepted Composite Indicators literature (Nardo et al., 2014). Our composite indicator 
incorporates information about days needed to be paid, rejected loans, the willingness of banks 
to provide a loan, interest rate for small loans, venture capital, private equity, business angels, 
and public funding. 
 
Our results show that labor market performance, measured by employment and unemployment 
growth rates is related to access to finance, measure by an access to finance composite indicator 
where several access to finance channels are taken into account. These results suggest that the 
positive effects of improvements in access to finance on job creation and employment growth 
documented at firm’s level are spread to magnitudes that refer to the whole economy. Ceteris 
paribus, better access to finance generates increases in employment growth rates and decreases 
in unemployment growth rates. Our results remain robust to various specifications and support 
previous findings from Belke, 2004 and Feldmann, 2014 showing access to finance as a 
determinant of labor market performance. Policies aiming at improving the business 
environment conditions for the SMEs are also able to improve labor market performance. 
Findings support the importance of the SBA framework in facilitating better and more inclusive 
labor markets in the EU28 area. Whether these policies should take the form of public financing 
schemes or subsidies, or they should provide benefits/tax exemptions to banks, venture 
capitalists or business angels should be the focus of future research. 
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